文章摘要
中国互联网信息服务业管制策略研究
Study on the regulation strategy of the internet information services based on principal-agency theory
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 互联网信息服务业  委托-代理  互联共享  激励机制
英文关键词: internet information services  principal-agency  inter-share  incentive mechanism
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA630071);重庆市科委软科学项目(cstc2011cx-rkxA00019);重庆邮电大学博士基金项目(k2011-17)
作者单位
卢安文,唐丹 重庆邮电大学 经济管理学院,重庆 400065 
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中文摘要:
      互联网信息服务业具有明显的网络外部性,但由于互联共享机制的缺失,导致互联网信息服务企业不正当竞争行为频发,阻碍了市场健康发展.研究互联网信息服务业管制中政府管制部门与企业间的委托代理关系,通过在Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中引入代表互联网信息服务企业实施互联共享率的参数,在非对称信息条件下,分析具有不同互联共享效率企业确定性等价收入和总代理成本的变化,在此基础上运用Matlab对模型进行模拟分析.结果表明:在非对称信息条件下,企业互联共享的努力水平越高,确定性等价收入越少;面临相同风险的情况下,实施互联共享效率越高的企业所支付的总代理成本越高.基于以上结论分析,给出相关的政策性建议.
英文摘要:
      There is obvious network externality in internet information service industry, but the flaw of current inter-share mechanism causes the unfair competition acting frequently, which hindered the healthy development of the market. The principal-agency relationship was studied between goverment and enterprises. A parameter was introduced to the Holmstrom-Milgrom model which represent the effciency of the internet information services enterprises implementing inter-share;under imperfect information, the variation of certainty equivalent income and total agent cost were analyzed by using different inter-share efficiency possess, A simulation was proceded to the Holmstrom-Milgrom model based on Matlab software. The results show that, under imperfect information, the higher effort enterprises do,the less certainty equivalent income they get; facing the risk ,the total agent cost of enterprises with higher efficency is higher. Based on the conclusion above, the relevant policy suggestions were given.
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